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Abstract: 
This thesis describes the United States’ campaign in the Philippines and the atrocities that 
occurred there and tells the story of how those atrocities were hidden, marginalized, and forgotten 
in the years after the war. I will show how this was not a natural process, that the Philippine-
American war was not passively misunderstood or forgotten. Instead, I will show how 
misinformation and the suppression of the truth was an orchestrated effort by imperialist politicians 
and military officials to control the narrative, justify their decisions and protect their policies. 
Specifically, this thesis will analyze the hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, which 
was tasked with investigating the reports of atrocities, as well as the military courts-martial after 
the war. Analysis of that bias and partisanship reveals that the hearings were more of a vindication 
than an investigation, and the courts-martial were more of a search for an excuse than a search for 
justice. This thesis will explain the precedents of military misconduct and political manipulation 
that were established by how United States politicians and military officials dealt with the 
atrocities that occurred during one of the United States’ first overseas imperialist occupations.  
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Stones Left Unturned 
Introduction and Historiography 
An American invasion, a military occupation, public outrage, human rights violations, and 
a tragic war that caused what historians have estimated to be up to a million dead and shaped two 
nations forever.1 For most Americans, these phrases and statements will remind them of the 
Vietnam War and indeed, these statements hold true for that conflict. But there was an earlier war 
that bears a resemblance to American conflicts of foreign occupation from Vietnam to the Second 
Persian Gulf War: the Philippine-American War. 
The Philippine-American War does not loom large in the collective memory of the United 
States. Even some avid students of history fail to learn of the war in the course of their education.2 
As Stuart Miller, a professor of history and the author of Benevolent Assimilation wrote, the United 
States suffers from a case of “imperialist amnesia” when trying to recall its long-forgotten wars.3 
To many students of history, this fact may seem an afterthought, a truism of American imperialism 
that simply has always been. But this was not preordained. Histories are formed and memories are 
shaped. This paper will explore how a group of Americans shaped our memory of one of America’s 
first overseas conquests: the Philippines. 
In this thesis, I will describe the United States’ campaign in the Philippines and the 
atrocities that occurred there and will tell the story of how those atrocities were hidden, 
marginalized, and forgotten in the years after the war. I will show how this was not a natural 
process, that the Philippine-American war was not passively misunderstood or forgotten. Instead, 
 
1 Luzviminda Francisco, “The First Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine War of 1899,” Critical Asian Studies 5, no. 4. 
(December 1973). 
2 Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust, (New York: New American Library, 2012) xi. 
3 Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 250. 
Khoshbin 5 
 
I will show how misinformation and the suppression of the truth was an orchestrated effort by 
imperialist politicians, military officials, and press to shape the nation’s memory and make the 
lessons of the Philippine-American War and the occupation of the archipelago fall into the 
shadows of the past. 
Furthermore, in the conclusion of this thesis, I will show the modern-day impact that this 
manipulation of the memory of the Philippine-American War has had on American foreign policy 
and military conduct. In the years since the Philippine-American War, politicians and even 
presidents such as George W. Bush and Donald Trump have made statements regarding the war 
that show a deep misunderstanding of the war and its impact. These misunderstandings have led 
these administrations to adopt rhetoric and policies that repeat the same mistakes made in the 
Philippines. Likewise, I will show how the military’s lack of accountability for the misconduct 
displayed during the war allowed for a culture of abuse that has infected the United States’ military 
operations in the majority of its overseas conflicts since. 
While I will rely on a variety of sources in this analysis, I will pay particular attention to 
two primary sources to show how supporters of the war in the government doctored the story and 
remembrance of the war. The first of these is the Affairs in the Philippines in the United States 
Congressional Record. This transcript recorded the proceedings of the Committee on the 
Philippines which was formed after the Philippine-American War. This source will show how the 
committee was used to validate the war effort and to discredit the war’s dissenters. The pro-war 
senators in the committee achieved these objectives through the selective calls of witnesses, the 
coaching of witnesses to elicit specific testimony, the unevenly abrasive treatment of witnesses 
who reported misconduct, the suppression of the press, and even the recording of the testimony. 
The second major source is the United States’ courts-martial transcripts from after the war, which 
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shows how government military personnel mitigated the consequences and impact of the 
Philippine-American War through their administration of justice. Despite cases involving water 
torture, the burning of towns, and the murder of prisoners of war, the courts-martial ended with 
what one historian described as “ludicrously light sentences” including six officers who “received 
nothing more than reprimands for shooting and torturing prisoners.”4 These courts-martial served 
as the opportunity to make an example of those who engaged in such atrocities and could have had 
a lasting impact on the conduct of the United States military, possibly even leading to regulations 
that could have stopped transgressions in wars since. More than this, if these courts-martial 
completed their goals and legitimized the complaints of those who pointed out the terrible 
conditions of this war, they could have changed how the United States remembers the war entirely. 
Before I delve into this story, it is important to explain some key terminology that will be 
used throughout this text. I will be referring to the conflict in the Philippines from 1899 to roughly 
1902 between the United States military and the Filipino nationalists and resistance fighters as the 
Philippine-American War. Within scholarship regarding the war, there has been a debate on what 
to call this conflict. The reasons for this debate are many. Since the formation of the Philippines 
as a nation was ongoing at the time of the conflict, some have taken issue with the term “Philippine-
American War,” since it insinuates a war between two nations. Some have used terms such as the 
“Filipino-American War,” the “Philippine Insurrection,” or the “Tagalog Insurgency.” Brian Linn, 
a distinguished military historian, avoids the confusion altogether by referring to the conflict as 
the Philippine War, focusing on the location instead of the warring parties.5 However, as Professor 
David Sibley explains, Filipino historians since the 1950s have thought of the war as the start of 
 
4 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 218. 
5 Brian Linn, The Philippine War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) x. 
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the Philippines nation. In the national memory of the Philippines, the war was a “ central event of 
the national myth” and a major factor in the “birth of the idea of a larger Filipino nation.”6 To 
reduce the war to just an insurgency would be degrading, and would validate the American 
occupation of the Philippines as true sovereignty. For these reasons, I will refer to the conflict 
throughout this text as the Philippine-American War.  
It is pertinent, also, to briefly discuss the historiography surrounding this topic. Before 
starting the composition of this thesis, I read the works of many other scholars on the Philippine-
American War, and always finished reading them with the same few questions. No matter how 
detailed the author was or how robust their sources, two aspects of the story of this calamitous 
conflict are left unexplored, or simply assumed to have been a certain way. These two aspects are 
the manipulative nature of politics and the injustice of the courts. More specifically, the biased 
process of the hearings of the Committee on the Philippines following the war and the dubious 
sentences of the courts-martial of United States military personnel following the war. Historians 
have been content to skim over how these procedures have taken place, to move on to more 
heady discussions on the development of imperialism or the details of the war itself. But how the 
United States government, both in Congress and in the military, chose to deal with the atrocities 
of the Philippine-American War has had grave consequences, and warrants further exploration. 
The hearings before the Committee on the Philippines were not only an investigation into 
the conduct of the United States military in the Philippines. The hearings also served as a debate 
stage for those politicians who supported the war and those who opposed it to make their case to 
the American people for how the United States should assert its power abroad. The significance 
 
6 David J. Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007) xiv. 
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of these hearings was not lost on scholars of the conflict, and many spend time discussing 
specific testimony and political arguments from key witnesses in the hearings. However, certain 
strategies used by those senators in the committee have not been discussed. It is important to 
note that ten out of the twelve senators on the committee during the hearings had previously been 
lawyers, and therefore knew all the tricks of asking questions, leading witnesses, and controlling 
a narrative. I will not only explore the rhetoric used in the hearings, but will break new ground in 
discussing how the senators who supported the war disrupted adverse testimony, used leading 
questions to get the answers they wanted, controlled what press were present during damaging 
testimony, and used their privileges as the majority party in the committee to limit the 
Democrats’ testimony and make sure that witnesses that supported the war went first and had the 
most time to testify. These strategies remain uncharted in the historiography surrounding the 
Philippine-American War, but were imperative in how and what the American public knew 
about the conflict, and therefore about how the conflict is perceived, remembered, or forgotten 
today. 
The courts-martial following the war had as large or possibly even a larger impact on 
United States military conduct during future overseas conflicts than the congressional hearings 
did. These trials served as the military’s opportunity to disavow the actions of certain personnel 
and dole out punishments that would set a standard for what is not acceptable behavior in the 
United States Armed Forces. Instead, few received harsh punishments despite vicious crimes. 
However, despite this being a failure of justice with massive consequences for the conduct of the 
United States’ military, the courts-martial following the Philippine-American War has not been 
adequately analyzed. When reading the works of acclaimed historians such as Stuart Miller, 
Gregg Jones, or David Sibley, the courts-martial would be mentioned, and the general defense 
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used by those accused would be cited and high profile cases such as those of Preston Brown or 
General Jacob Smith would be used as examples of how easily military personnel avoided harsh 
punishments. But I was always left with the question, how did they get away with it? There were 
innumerable trials with different juries and in different locations. Yet, the perpetrators almost all 
received nothing more than a slap on the wrist. I will explore what strategies and rhetoric were 
used to defend the actions of accused military personnel who committed violent acts and tortured 
Filipinos as well as how the courts managed their cases, decided on sentencing and how the 
sentencing for these serious violent crimes compared to the sentencing of other military 
misconduct cases. 
Lastly, this thesis relates to current events. Scholars such as Francisco Luzviminda and 
Stuart Miller related tragically overlooked lessons of the Philippine-American War to the 
Vietnam War, Frank Schumacher compared it to the War on Terror, and Gregg Jones highlighted 
the parallels between the Philippine-American War and the Second Gulf War. While I too will 
emphasize these conflicts in the conclusion of this thesis as examples of what the United States 
failed to learn from the Philippines, I will also relate it to events from the current administration 
of the United States. This will include statements made by the President that show how 
mischaracterized the Philippine-American War is, and contemporary examples of the continued 
practice of manipulating hearings and investigations in Congress. 
Scholars have not taken the time to study the how of these events. Some are content just 
to state the outcomes or outline the main points of the manipulation of the hearings or the 
ineffectual nature of the military courts and chalk it up to the unscrupulousness of politicians and 
the proclivity of the United States military to turn a blind eye. But the how is the most important 
question to answer if the United States is to deal with its mistakes in a more ethical way in the 
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future. This thesis will contribute to the historiography of the Philippine-American War by 
bringing to light how these hearings and courts-martial were manipulated to control the impact 
and perception of the conflict and how this relates to current issues of political spin and military 
misconduct that the United States is dealing with currently. 
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The Road to War 
Background 
 To understand the Philippine-American War and how its story was manipulated, we must 
first understand the conflict and the rhetoric with which the United States postured on the world 
stage as a benevolent savior. By understanding the significance of the wave of imperialist 
sentiment that led to the Philippine-American War, and the politicians whose careers were 
steeped in that sentiment, we can better understand the stakes of the war’s message back home. 
To do so, we must start decades before the war broke out. 
The end of the nineteenth century saw the rise of the United States as a global power. The 
Wild West had been tamed, the wars with the Native Americans were all but won and railroads 
crisscrossed the nation. Katharine Lee Bates had not yet written the famous words but it was 
already true that America stretched “from sea to shining sea.” America’s frontier was 
disappearing, and it did not take long for the American people to look across those shining seas 
for the next one.  
 Of course, thoughts of overseas expansion were nothing new. Under the guise of the 
Monroe Doctrine and the “protection” of New World lands from European colonialism, 
American politicians had pushed for overseas expansion for decades. John Quincy Adams had 
described Cuba and Santo Domingo as “natural appendages” to the United States that were 
needed for naval protection of the mainland.7 President Grant had attempted to annex the 
Dominican Republic, stating “they yearn for the protect[ion] of our free institutions and laws, our 
 
7  Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 3. 
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progress and civilization. Shall we refuse them?”8 In 1881, Secretary of State James G. Blaine 
for President Garfield signed a treaty with Hawaii stating that the islands were “within the 
American system.”9 This excitement for expansion reached a fever pitch in the 1890s as relations 
with Spain and its North American territories became strained. 
 Spain had long been the face of failing, immoral European colonialism. Particularly, 
Spain’s struggle to maintain its sovereignty over Cuba throughout the late nineteenth century 
was the latest example of a deteriorating European colonial model. Cuban revolutionaries were 
organized and determined and by the late 1890s the Spanish resorted to desperate and brutal 
measures to hold onto the remnants of their New World holdings. Under the rule of Governor-
General Valeriano Weyler, Spanish forces instituted concentration camps in which thousands of 
Cubans starved. Weyler went further and started an anti-insurgency campaign of torture, murder, 
and martial law to regain control of the island. Eventually, this affected United States interests 
when American citizens on the island reported being threatened or otherwise mistreated.10 At this 
point of rising national pride in America, it did not take much for a European power encroaching 
on the New World to raise the ire of the United States. And Spain did just that.  
The American press latched onto the conflict, demonizing the Spanish, especially 
Valeriano Weyler, who was referred to as “the Butcher,” a “mad dog,” and a “human hyena.”11 
The Chicago Daily Tribune wrote an article on the general with the headline “Weyler’s Savage 
Proclamation” that described Valeriano’s plan to “crush out the spirit of liberty in that 
unfortunate island.” After comparing Weyler’s rule in Cuba to that of a previous ruthless Spanish 
 
8 “May 31, 1870: Message Regarding Dominican Republic Annexation,” University of Virginia Miller Center. 
9 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 5. 
10 David J. Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007) 32. 
11 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 9. 
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general, the Count of Valmaceda Blas Villate, the newspaper ends the article by stating that 
“Cuba must not be subjected in like manner to Spanish barbarity.”12  
American politicians likewise expressed their desire for action. John M. Thurston, a 
Republican senator from Nebraska, traveled to Cuba with a congressional delegation to see the 
developing conflict first hand. During this trip, his wife died of fever in Cuba, and upon his 
return he gave a powerful speech before Congress.13 In this speech, Senator Thurston stated that 
“Spain has lost control of every foot of Cuba not surrounded by an actual intrenchment” and 
explained in detail the horrible realities of the concentration camps in Cuba. Thurston addressed 
the President directly, stating that “Mr. President, there is only one action possible… intervention 
for the independence of the island; intervention that means the landing of an American army on 
Cuban soil.” He likened not intervening to passing “along the street to see a helpless dog 
stamped into the earth under the heels of a ruffian.”14 This speech epitomized the popular 
political rhetoric for intervention: the idea that the United States could be the savior to fix the 
problem. Many in Congress urged President Cleveland to act, and he did take some action. 
President Cleveland urged Spain to end the conflict in Cuba with increasing diplomatic pressure 
involving letters and threats of action, but to no avail.15  
More effective than any call to war was the destruction of the USS Maine in the Havana 
harbor. The naval battleship was sent to Havana to protect American property in the city during a 
series of riots. But shortly after arriving the battleship exploded on February 15th, 1898, killing 
 
12 “Weyler’s Savage Proclamations,” Chicago Daily Tribune. Feb. 18th, 1896, 6. 
13 Kristin Hoganson, American Empire at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2017) 
62-63. 
14 Remarks of Senator Thurston, Congressional Record, 55th Cong. 2nd Sess. March 24, 1898, 3162-65. 
15 Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire, 32. / Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 9. 
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266 American servicemen on board.16 This put America’s tense relationship with Spain over the 
edge. Press in the United States ran headlines such as “This means war!” and support for military 
intervention swelled. A preliminary investigation into the explosion reported the ship had been 
destroyed by a sea mine. This was enough for President McKinley and Congress to authorize a 
military engagement with Spain, and war was declared on April 25th,1898.17 Later investigations 
of the USS Maine found that it was not destroyed by a mine, and instead the explosion was 
caused by a fire in the coal supply that caught the ship’s ammunition on fire.18 But the damage 
was already done. The United States and Spain went to war. 
The Spanish-American War is not the focus of this thesis, but its conclusion has 
important implications for the Philippines. The war was an unmitigated victory for the United 
States, and before the end of the year Spain sued for peace. In December of 1898, the Queen 
Regent of Spain in the name of her son, Don Alfonso XIII, met with delegates of the United 
States to sign what would come to be known as the 1898 Treaty of Paris. This treaty 
encapsulated seventeen articles, mostly referring to the rights of their citizens and trade 
agreements affected by the war. Significantly, however, the first three articles ceded Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, the Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States.19  
During the Spanish-American War, the United States sent a naval fleet under Admiral 
Dewey to capture Manila, the center of Spanish control in the Philippines. The American fleet, 
much larger and more advanced than that of the Spanish, easily destroyed the Spanish fleet 
 
16 Kristin Hoganson, American Empire at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 11. 
17 Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire, 33-34. 
18 Hoganson, American Empire at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 11. 
19 U.S. Congress, 55th Cong. A Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1899). 
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without losing a single ship or sailor.20 When the peace treaty was signed, this American military 
force became the de facto rulers of the city. However, their occupation did not come without 
opposition. 
The Spanish struggle to control the Philippines did not start with the Spanish-American 
War. Massive currency inflation and a series of military losses in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century made Spain desperate to cling to its colonial holdings during this economic downturn. 
This desperation to maintain control led Spain to implement harsh restrictions on the rights of 
Filipinos to suppress any thoughts of rebellion as famine and disease ravaged the islands. This 
backfired, and violent uprising arose all across the Philippines in the 1890’s. Emilio Aguinaldo, a 
wealthy, educated, Filipino landowner, eventually came out as the champion of these revolutions 
and organized a Filipino nationalist party that formed a revolutionary government aimed at 
seeing the Philippines free of Spanish control.21 
Originally, Aguinaldo welcomed United States military aid in the fight against the 
Spanish, but tensions rose quickly as this alliance faded. In July of 1898, Emilio Aguinaldo said 
in a meeting with American officers that “I have studied attentively the Constitution of the 
United States and in it I find no authority for colonies and I have no fear.”22 Furthermore, in one 
of his first meetings with Admiral Dewey, Aguinaldo claims that Dewey promised him 
independence for the Philippines, although Dewey later denied ever stating anything of the 
kind.23 Although Aguinaldo may have originally had fond ideas about the intentions of the 
Americans, this notion faded as American occupation of Manila continued. 
 
20 Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire, 33-34. 
21 Ibid, 10-11. 
22 Ibid, 46. 
23 Ibid, 41. 
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While Dewey and Aguinaldo had a standoff in Manila, imperialist rhetoric supporting the 
war began to strengthen back in the states leading up to the presidential election of 1900. 
President McKinley, originally cagey on the issue of foreign land occupation by the United 
States, began to speak in favor of this policy after his advisors noted its public support. Henry 
Cabot Lodge, a Republican senator from Massachusetts, reported to the President that 
“Republican conventions are all declaring that where the flag goes it must never come down.” 
Republican Senator Orville Platt likewise advised McKinley to support the imperialist policy, 
telling him that ninety percent of voters in Connecticut were in favor of holding onto the 
Philippines.24 As the Republicans began to create a consistent message to the people on the 
subject, anti-war Democrats floundered in response. 
While there was significant resistance to the rising imperialist sentiments in the United 
States, the response was disjointed and sometimes even self-destructive. The anti-imperialists 
were a mismatched group of lofty humanitarian-minded intellectuals on one side and ex-
Confederates who did not want Cubans and Filipinos to be a part of the Union on the other. The 
best example of this dichotomy is comparing the anti-imperial article of Mark Twain titled “To 
the Man Sitting in the Darkness,” to the anti-imperial article by Varina Davis, once the first lady 
of the Confederacy, titled “Why We Do Not Want the Philippines.” In “To the Man Sitting in the 
Darkness,” Mark Twain compares the United States to pirates and states that America should 
change its flag so that the “white stripes [are] painted black and the stars are replaced by the skull 
and crossbones.”25 Twain goes on to compare the United States to the very imperialist powers it 
had fought against in the past: Britain and Spain. This rhetoric made for an effective read, but 
 
24 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 23. 
25 Mark Twain, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness," The North American Review (172, no. 531, 1901) 172. 
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was completely at odds with that of another camp of anti-imperialists better exemplified by 
Varina Davis’ article. In “Why We Do Not Want the Philippines,” Davis states that “my most 
serious objection to making the Philippines American territories is because three-fourth of the 
population is made up of negroes,” and “what are we going to do with these additional millions 
of negroes?”26 Many Americans shared Davis’ perspective and Senator Ben Tillman from South 
Carolina as well as other politicians used similar rhetoric to that of Davis in the halls of 
Congress.27  
In stark contrast to these white supremacists were prominent African Americans such as 
W.E.B. Du Bois and elite East Coast intellectuals such as the presidents of Harvard and Cornell 
who also supported anti-imperialist policies.28 The anti-imperialists were not unified, and were 
outnumbered in Washington when compared to the scores of senators and congressmen that 
supported occupation. With Washington hardening its resolve on imperialism, Emilio 
Aguinaldo’s chance to gain control of the Philippines began to slip away. 
After the defeat of the Spanish in Manila, Aguinaldo asked the Americans to allow his 
army, which he referred to as the Army of Liberation, to occupy the city. American officers 
denied the Philippine army entry. Instead, General Wesley Merritt told Aguinaldo that “the 
government of the United States, you may be assured, for which as its agent I can make no 
promises, will deal fairly with the Filipino, but we must now insist for the good of all there 
should be no joint occupation of Manila.”29 Instead the Filipino soldiers stayed in camps on the 
outskirts of the city, simply awaiting the formal surrender of the Spanish to the Americans. 
 
26 Varina Davis, “Why We Do Not Want the Philippines,” (Arena 23, 1900) 2-4 
27 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 26. 
28 Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019) 81. 
29 Quoted in Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 44. 
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Although the two armies did not share the city, tensions flared as the months went on with no 
signs of the United States handing the city over.  
The already tense situation was made worse when the relatively diplomatic General 
Merritt was removed in favor of General Otis. General Elwell Otis was an accomplished Civil 
War general whom Professor Stuart Miller described as “fastidious, pompous, and fussy”30 and 
Professor Brian Linn remarks that he “was to become one of the unpopular, maligned, and 
controversial commanders in the islands.”31 Indeed, General Otis made a series of decisions that 
upset Aguinaldo and his forces. He moved the American military line further into territory 
controlled by Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation, often threatening “forcible action” if they did not 
retreat from their positions immediately.32 These advances by the United States did not honor the 
boundary lines conceded to by Otis’ predecessor, General Merritt, leading to frustrating 
negotiations. 
The border between the two armies was the site of frequent outbreaks of violence. 
American soldiers often called Filipino civilians and soldiers derogatory slurs and subjected 
them to random searches. At times, these searches devolved into beatings. In some cases, 
Filipinos were even killed, such as one instance in which a soldier shot a civilian for “looking 
suspicious” and another when a Filipino soldier was killed for approaching an American position 
unannounced. Even General Otis spoke up on the subject, recounting an incident when a woman 
and child were “accidentally shot.” Although there are more cases of American violence against 
Filipinos, the assaults were not one-sided. There was a report of a Filipino soldier who swung a 
bolo at an American soldier, another report of an American soldier being shot to death by a 
 
30 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 46. 
31 Brian Linn, The Philippine War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) 27. 
32 Linn, The Philippine War, 30. 
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Filipino sentry, and one confusing incident of an American soldier being killed and two others 
being injured behind Filipino lines. Aguinaldo claimed the soldiers were drunk and had shot one 
another.33 
The tensions finally reached a boiling point, and after months of negotiations and 
outbreaks of isolated violence, war broke out in Manila once again. The ensuing chapter will 
survey the key points of that war which will be necessary to understand the war’s significance 
and just how misunderstood it would become. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Linn, The Philippine War. 27 / Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 58-59 
Khoshbin 20 
 
A War of American Atrocities 
Background 
The actual impetus of the Philippine-American War continues to be shrouded in mystery. 
Some contended that General Otis was pushing for war the whole time. Stuart Miller wrote that 
Otis was trying to “provoke his war” with aggressive troop movements and unreasonable 
demands.34 Brian Linn took issue with that assessment, and stated that the “generals most 
strident critic, Stuart Miller, perversely terms Otis ‘a man of limited ability and understanding’ 
and yet accuses him of cleverly masterminding the outbreak of war.”35 David Sibley points out 
that Aguinaldo’s control over the Army of Liberation was loosening, and that the frustration of 
months of concessions to American forces could have led his officers to start an unauthorized 
advance on American positions, forcing Aguinaldo into war.36 Motivations aside, it is clear that 
the war started on February 4th, 1899. 
On the night of the 4th, a patrolling American force approached a group of Filipino 
soldiers in an area that both sides claimed to be under their control. The American soldiers 
reported that the Filipino soldiers approached their position and refused an order to halt. Some 
Filipino historians claim the shootings were unprovoked.37 Either way, the Americans fired on 
the Filipino soldiers and fighting broke out, starting the Battle of Manila. The Battle of Manila 
was gruesome and would set the precedent for a bloody war.  
The Battle of Manila raged for two weeks and quickly devolved into an unorganized 
street fight. American forces found themselves engaging not only uniformed Filipino soldiers, 
 
34 Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 59-60. 
35 Brian Linn, The Philippine War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) 29. 
36 David J. Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007) 66. 
37 Sibley, A War of Frontier and Empire, 64. 
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but also Filipino insurgents and rebels in civilian garb. The Army of Liberation was not as well-
trained or organized and their coordination with insurgents was poor. This resulted in a series of 
ill-planned attacks on American positions. The battle was a clear American victory. With 
Aguinaldo’s forces being forced into a retreat away from the city which they had been waiting to 
march through since their resistance against the Spanish started years ago. Although the battle 
was an American victory, there were heavy casualties taken by both armies, and there were 
reports of American soldiers shooting civilians indiscriminately in the streets of Manila, and 
even shooting prisoners.38 
From Manila, the war spread across the Philippines. Aguinaldo, whose army faced 
recurrent defeat on the battlefield, established a mandatory militia and guerilla organization. He 
mandated that all men age sixteen to fifty-nine be armed with bolos and fight in the militia and 
that each town’s municipal government also serve as a committee of defense.39 However, this 
focus on guerilla warfare and militia fighting led to the United States military’s retaliation being 
carried out on the towns and their citizens. United States troops put the Philippines under martial 
law, set up concentration zones and destroyed food stores and farms to cut off the guerilla 
fighters’ food supply.40 The United States military fought a war of duality, against both the Army 
of Liberation and the unseen insurgents living amongst the Filipino population. This led to many 
civilian casualties, which made up the great majority of the war’s casualty estimates, which 
range from around two-hundred and fifty thousand to approximately one million.41  
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The United States’ war against the Filipino population was not only the product of harsh 
anti-insurgency tactics, however. As Frank Schumacher, a professor at Western Ontario 
University specializing in American colonialism and imperialism put it, the vast majority of 
American soldiers during the Philippine-American War were, “white, young, and equipped with 
little military training.”42 They were ill-prepared for the guerilla warfare they encountered in the 
Philippines, and they quickly became frustrated by the insurgency’s tactics. This is clearly 
reflected in letters sent by American soldiers during the war. Captain John Leland of the 38th 
Volunteer Regiment, wrote home that “the women and children hate the U.S. soldiers, and in 
their language, a kind of dog language, they frequently abuse us… we catch their soldiers in 
civilian garb and turn them loose because we cannot prove who they are.”43 Frustration and racist 
sentiments grew quickly, and soon turned to violence. One soldier during the war wrote that “no 
cruelty is too severe for these brainless monkeys.” Another soldier wrote that “This shooting 
human beings is a “hot game” and beats rabbit hunting all to pieces… we killed them like 
rabbits, hundreds, yes thousands of them. Everyone was crazy… No more prisoners.”44  
It was not only front-line soldiers who possessed this mentality: it was shared and 
justified by U.S. military commanders. General Macarthur himself, in a speech to the Senate in 
1900, stated that “men who participate in hostilities without being a part of a regular organized 
force… divest themselves of the character of soldiers and if captured are not entitled to 
privileges of prisoners of war.”45 The encouragement of this violent misconduct was also 
reinforced by General Jacob Smith, who told his soldiers to “kill and burn and turn Samar into a 
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howling wilderness” and even gave orders to kill all boys capable of fighting over ten.”46 As 
American soldiers continued to dehumanize the Filipino people, they utilized torture more and 
more, most notably, the “water cure”. 
The water cure is a practice that predates the United States. Originally used by the 
Spanish Inquisition, the water cure has been used to elicit confessions for centuries. The water 
cure involves the practice of inserting a spout into the mouth of the victim and forcibly pumping 
water into them. This eventually fills their stomach and intestines, causing their organs to stretch 
and convulse.47 Edward Peters, a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania and 
author of the book Torture, wrote that the water cure causes “some of the most intense pain that 
visceral tissue can experience.”48 Darius Rejali, a political science professor at Reed College 
specializing in torture, wrote in his book Torture and Democracy that victims of the water cure 
“feel their organs are being burned or cut on the inside.”49  
While these atrocities transpired in the Philippines, a different kind of war raged in the 
United States. Fierce debate about whether or not America should occupy the Philippines found 
its way into magazines and newspapers, into campaign rallies, and onto the floor of Congress. 
On the campaign trail for the presidential election of 1900, McKinley continued to solidify his 
attitude on holding the Philippines. In a speech in Boston, McKinley dismissed concerns about 
the morality of the war, stating: “Could we, after freeing the Filipinos from the domination of 
Spain, have left them without government and without power to protect life or property or to 
perform the international obligations essential to an independent state?... Did we need their 
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consent to perform a great act of humanity?... We were doing our duty by them, as God gave us 
the light to see our duty, with the consent of our own consciences and with the approval of 
civilization.”50 This speech resonates with the rhetoric of the “white man’s burden,” which was a 
common strategy of justifying the war. 
Another rhetoric that supported the war was espoused by McKinley’s vice-presidential 
running mate for the presidential election of 1900: Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt, who gained 
renown for his military service leading the “Rough Riders” during the Spanish-American War, 
rode his new-found fame up the political ladder from Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to 
Governor of New York in 1898, to vice presidential candidate in 1899. While on the campaign 
trail, he gave a speech at the Hamilton Club in Chicago, an all-male club, where he stated that 
“We do not admire the man of timid peace. We admire the man who embodies victorious 
effort… a man must be glad to do a man’s work… we cannot avoid the responsibilities that 
confront us in Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.”51 This appeal to men’s 
masculinity to convince them to support war and expansion was an effective strategy that would 
become a staple of Roosevelt’s political career. 
While McKinley argued morality and Roosevelt appealed to men’s masculinity, a young 
senator from Indiana was supporting the war through the promise of wealth. After a six-month 
trip to the Philippines, Senator Albert Beveridge returned to the Senate to make an impassioned 
speech in favor of continuing to occupy the islands.52 He argued that “just beyond the Philippines 
 
50 William McKinley, “Speech at Dinner of the Home Market Club, Boston, February 16, 1899,” Speeches and 
Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900 (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1900) 
187-193 
51 Theodore Roosevelt, “The Strenuous Life” in American Ideals, the Strenuous Life, Realizable Ideals, ed. 
Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 319-323. 
52 Hoganson, American Empire at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96. 
Khoshbin 25 
 
are China’s illimitable markets” and that “our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia.” 
Beveridge not only argued that the Philippines served as a nexus for trade with China, but also 
that the Philippines themselves were ripe for exploitation. He stated that “No land in America 
surpassed in fertility the plains and valleys of Luzon” and that the “woods of the Philippines can 
supply the furniture of the world for a century to come.”53  
While imperialists promised riches and the fulfillment of American destiny, anti-
imperialists continued their struggle to gather supporters. Even as the war dragged on and 
support for the war waned, anti-imperialists failed to capitalize on the opportunity.54 The Anti-
Imperialist League, an organization formed near the end of the Spanish-American War, had a 
brief stint of success. Within a year of its founding in June of 1898, the Anti-Imperialist League 
claimed over seventy thousand members. The group busied itself creating pamphlets, sending 
petitions to the president, and holding rallies protesting the conquest of the Philippines. 
However, most of these efforts fell short of the group’s goals. The group’s founding-day rally in 
the center of Boston drew only around three-hundred people, a petition sent to President 
McKinley, which the group bragged would include ten million signatures, actually reached the 
President’s desk with only two thousand signatures, and one of the group’s executive member’s 
was publicly threatened with treason and sedition charges by the attorney general for his plan to 
send anti-war material to United States soldiers in the Philippines. Furthermore, while opposition 
to the Philippine-American War had solid support, the leaders of the movement insisted on also 
opposing the much more popular Spanish-American War and the annexation of Hawaii. 55 Next 
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to the upbeat, patriotic message of politicians such as McKinley, Roosevelt, and Beveridge, anti-
imperialists had trouble enticing the general public.  
The biggest blow to the anti-imperialists, however, was the result of the presidential 
election of 1900. William Jennings Bryan was nominated for a second time to run in the general 
election for the Democrats against the incumbent, President McKinley. The anti-imperialists’ last 
chance to take advantage of the public’s brief disapproval of the prolonged war in the Philippines 
was dashed on a candidate that brought along with him too much political baggage. William 
Jennings Bryan may have been publicly against occupying the Philippines, but he voted to ratify 
the Treaty of Paris during his time in the Senate. This hypocritical action alienated him from 
staunch anti-imperialists, who already had to stomach his “free silver” movement, which was a 
platform to transition the dollar to being based on silver. Overall, Bryan turned out not to be the 
ideal candidate to carry the anti-imperialist message, and his failure against McKinley in the 
election of 1900 allowed for the continuation of the war in the Philippines.56 
With McKinley’s reelection in 1900, and therefore the public show of support to continue 
the war, the United States military fought with a renewed vigor in the Philippines. Under the new 
leadership of General Macarthur, who replaced the aging General Otis, United States soldiers 
became even more aggressive, burning towns, rounding up townspeople into concentration 
camps and executing suspected insurgents. Surely enough, the numbers of surrendering guerilla 
fighters began to increase.57 In March, just months after the United States’ renewed offensive, 
the revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo was captured.58  
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However, as their numbers dwindled, and their leaders were lost, the Filipino insurgents 
became more desperate and brutal than ever. In September of 1901, Filipino insurgents dressed 
as civilians launched an attack on an United States Army Company in the town of Balangiga 
while they were eating breakfast. Caught unawares, the insurgents quickly surrounded and 
assaulted the American soldiers with machetes known as bolos. Forty-eight United States 
soldiers were killed. The event became known as the Balangiga Massacre and was the single 
worst United States military disaster of the war.59 
If the United States military was not harsh before, it was unquestionably ruthless after the 
Balangiga Massacre. General Chaffee promised to instill a “wholesome fear”60 of the United 
States in the Philippines. The fighting on Samar became particularly vicious under the leadership 
of General Jacob Smith. Marines later reported during an investigation that Smith had ordered 
them to “kill and burn” and “turn Samar into a howling wilderness.” It would also later be 
revealed that General Smith had ordered that even children ten years of age that were seen 
carrying bolos or knives were to be killed.61 Professor Luzviminda Francisco describes this stage 
of the war as “degenerating into mass slaughter.”62 
Crushed by the United States’ harsh tactics, the numbers of insurgent attacks began to 
lessen, and by the summer of 1902 the United States no longer considered them a viable threat. 
In a speech on July 4th, 1902, President Roosevelt declared the “insurrection” in the Philippines 
over, and that it was “one of the most glorious wars in American history.”63 However, his 
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declaration of a “glorious war” rang hollow, as debates had raged in Congress since that January 
as to the conduct of the United States military during the war. 
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The Hearings 
Roosevelt’s declaration of victory in the Philippines was not the glorious conclusion to 
the conflict that he made it out to be in his speech. The first reason for this is that his declaration 
was premature, as fighting between the United States and insurgents continued in the Philippines 
for over a decade after he gave his speech in July of 1902.64 But the most significant blemish on 
the face of the conflict were the atrocities committed by American soldiers in the Philippines.  
As more and more soldiers returned home during the closing months of the war, reports 
of cruelty became more frequent in the press. Prominent newspaper editors, such as Herbert 
Welsh of the Philadelphia newspaper City and State, called for an investigation of the United 
States military’s actions.65 Anti-imperialists in the Senate seized on the wave of public interest, 
and on January 13th, 1902, Senator George Frisbie Hoar, who had been against the Philippine-
American War since its inception, introduced a resolution to the floor of the Senate calling for a 
committee to investigate the conduct of the war. However, anti-imperialists were not the only 
ones with designs for how to capitalize on the scandal. Republican senators who supported the 
war not only had the support of the President, who was an avid supporter of the conflict, but also 
held the majority in an existing committee on the Philippines under the chairmanship of Henry 
Cabot Lodge. The very next day after Hoar introduced his resolution on the floor of the Senate, 
Lodge stated that his Committee on the Philippines held jurisdiction over the investigation, a 
statement that Hoar had difficulty contesting. Lodge then passed a resolution with unanimous 
consent that gave his committee the responsibility of holding the hearings.66  
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The significance of this early move by Lodge cannot be overstated. The Republicans, the 
majority of whom had supported the war, held the majority in the Committee on the Philippines 
and Lodge, who was one of the war’s biggest advocates, was the Chairman. Lodge’s vehement 
approval of imperialism and occupying the Philippines was showcased in a speech he gave in 
1899 on the floor of the Senate where he proclaimed that “ I believe the power of the United 
States in any territory or possession outside the limits of the States themselves is absolute” and 
that “it is for us to decide the destiny of the Philippines.”67 Not only was the committee mostly 
made up of Republicans who supported the war with a passionate imperialist as the Chairman, 
but as the majority the Republicans enjoyed certain privileges over the minority beyond their 
sheer numbers.  
The majority party in a Senate committee gets the most amount of time to question 
witnesses and get to call the majority of the witnesses. Technically, by Senate rules, the majority 
party is only required to offer the minority party one day to call their own witnesses. 
Furthermore, the Chairman, Lodge in this case, holds the duty of sending the official letters 
inviting witnesses to testify. The Chairman gets to decide what day they testify, allowing him to 
stack the order of the witnesses in whichever way he so chooses.68 Lodge made the most of this 
power. This chapter will show that Lodge gave witnesses whose testimony he supported more 
time, limited the time and number of adverse witnesses, and stacked the order so that witnesses 
supportive of his goal to validate the war effort went at better times.  
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But clever use of the powers wielded by the Chairman and the power of the majority 
were not the only ways that imperialists manipulated the hearings. Ten out of the twelve senators 
on the committee were lawyers, and the art of controlling a narrative was something they knew 
well.69 This chapter will also show how senators often interrupted the testimony of adverse 
witnesses, used leading questions to get witnesses to say what they wanted, and even controlled 
what press was present during testimony and adopted other strategies to bias the hearings. 
Witness Calls, Order, and Testimony Time 
After Lodge asserted his right to run the investigation, the Committee began calling 
witnesses. Before delving into the details of the witnesses’ testimony, it is important first to note 
what witnesses were called, in what order, and how much testimony each was allowed to give. 
Shown in the table below are the names of the witnesses in the order of their testimony, the 
amount of days each was allowed to testify, and the number of pages their testimony filled on the 
official public Congressional Record transcript. This table shows that witnesses who I will 
subsequently show were partial to defending the war and in favor of holding the Philippines were 
more numerous, testified for more days, and had more overall testimony on the record than 
witnesses who disapproved of the war or simply were called to present evidence that was 
primarily adverse to the chairman and the majorities’ views. In fact, many of the soldiers called 
to testify were chosen by Chairman Lodge from a “safe” list given to him by Secretary of War 
Elihu Root.70 This table only includes spoken testimony and does not include the hundreds of 
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pages of submitted documentary evidence brought forward by witnesses or the senators, which 
will be analyzed subsequently. 
 
Order of First 
Appearance*1 
Name and Title*2 Pro / Anti 
Philippines 
War/Occupation 
Witness*3 
Days of 
Testimony*4 
Pages of Testimony 
1 Governor William 
Howard Taft 
Pro-
War/Occupation 
15 423 
2 General Robert Hughes Pro-
War/Occupation 
10 173 
3 Mister David Barrows Pro-
War/Occupation 
3 56 
4 General Elwell Otis Pro-
War/Occupation 
4 119 
5 General Arthur 
Macarthur 
Pro-
War/Occupation 
9 152 
6 Sergeant Charles Riley Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 11 
7 Private William Smith Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 9 
8 Sergeant Edward Davis Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 10 
9 Lieutenant Grover Flint Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 19 
10 Sergeant Leroy Hallock Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 16 
11 Corporal Daniel Evans Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 9 
12 Sergeant Richard 
Hughes 
Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 7 
13 Sergeant Isadore Dube Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 8 
14 Sergeant Januarius 
Manning 
Anti-
War/Occupation 
1 8 
15 Sergeant William Gibbs Pro 
War/Occupation 
2 26 
16 71George Boardman Pro 
War/Occupation 
2 24 
17 Lieutenant Jesse Hall Pro 
War/Occupation 
1 12 
 
71 Military Rank Never Stated  
Figure 1 
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18 Corporal Richard 
O’Brien 
Anti 
War/Occupation 
3 39 
19 General William 
Crozier 
Pro 
War/Occupation 
1 5 
20 Bishop James Thoburn Pro 
War/Occupation 
2 40 
21 Captain Fred McDonald Pro 
War/Occupation 
2 36 
22 Colonel Arthur Wagner Pro 
War/Occupation 
2 34 
23 Sergeant Mark Evans Pro 
War/Occupation 
1 14 
24 72Seiward Norton Pro 
War/Occupation 
1 11 
25 Admiral George Dewey Pro 
War/Occupation 
3 58 
*1 Some witnesses’ testimony was broken up with other testimony in between. For simplicity’s sake, this graph 
orders them by their first appearance.  
*2 Some of these are former titles. For example, Mark Evans was formerly a sergeant, and by the time of the 
hearings he was out of the army. However, since their time in the military is what they are primarily testifying to, 
their latest ranks will be noted here for the reader’s understanding. 
*3 This column delineates whether the testimony of the witness was primarily used to support or hurt the narrative of 
the Philippine-American War and/or support further occupation of the Philippines based on my reading of the 
hearings. I subsequently analyze much of the rhetoric and opinions espoused by these witnesses, which make my 
decisions for the delineations in this table clear. 
*4 The amount of time that the various witnesses testified during a single day varied witness to witness, this column 
simply tracks how many calendar days each witness appeared before the committee.73 
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As shown in the table and graphs, overall, witnesses that were partial to the war effort 
and holding the Philippines as a territory, and who testified in support of these causes numbered 
15, cumulatively testified on 58 days, and provided testimony spanning 1,183 pages of the 
Congressional Record. Witnesses whose testimony did not overall support these causes 
numbered 10, cumulatively testified on 12 days and their testimony covered 136 pages of the 
Congressional Record. Even witnesses called on at the request of anti-imperialist Democrats like 
Senator Culberson, such as soldier Seiward Norton, were often hostile to anti-imperialist 
questioning over military misconduct.74 
 This is not surprising. Since the hearings mostly covered issues of the United States’ 
military misconduct and most witnesses were military personnel, it is to be expected that many 
would be defensive or hostile to questioning over the topic. This reflects Lodge’s strategy of 
stacking the hearing with members of the United States Armed Forces, partial to defending their 
 
74 Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearings before the Committee in the Philippines of the United States. 2895. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Number of 
Witnesses
Pro-War/Occupation
Anti-War/Occupation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Days of Testimony
Pro-War/Occupation
Anti-War/Occupation
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
Pages of Testimony 
on Record
Pro-War/Occupation
Anti-War/Occupation
Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
Khoshbin 35 
 
actions. Lodge did not allow any Filipinos to testify. In fact, critics called upon Lodge to call the 
revolutionary leader himself, Emilio Aguinaldo to testify, or his cabinet member Sixto Lopez 
who was sent to the United States to negotiate peace. The Democrats even made a motion to call 
Filipino witnesses, but Chairman Lodge blocked the motion and never took action to call either 
of these witnesses nor any other Filipino witness.75 
 This table also shows how the order was stacked to benefit the Chairman’s views. The 
hearings began and ended with witnesses particularly partial to defending American involvement 
in the Philippines. The first witness that Lodge had testify was William Howard Taft, who was 
granted the enviable position of provincial-governor of the Philippines before being asked to 
testify on why the very territory he was granted control over ought to continue to be held by the 
United States. To highlight how biased Taft was, he testified the absolutism that “never was a 
war conducted, whether against inferior races or not, in which there were more compassion and 
more restraint and more generosity, assuming that there was a war at all, than there have been in 
the Philippine Islands.”76 The last witness was Admiral George Dewey, whose very career and 
legacy hinged on the positive memory of the Philippine-American War. After a career that 
historian Gregg Jones referred to as “unremarkable,”77 Admiral Dewey’s only crowning 
achievement was his capture of Manila from the Spanish fleet that started the de facto American 
occupation in the Philippines. He was even stated to have said the day before his attack “I have 
waited for sixty years for this opportunity.”78 Predictably, he defended the war that he hung his 
career on, testifying that Aguinaldo’s call for independence was “so unimportant and so trivial 
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that I did not cable it to Washington.”79 Chairman Lodge and the other Republican senators had 
stacked the deck from the start. But they didn’t stop there. 
Objecting To and Interrupting Adverse Testimony 
 One of the most blatant ways that the Republicans controlled the hearings was by 
interrupting adverse testimony. When they could, they cleverly masked these interruptions as 
objections to committee rules that Chairman Lodge had in place, but as I will show, they 
selectively applied these rules only to opposing witnesses. 
The best example of this selective use of Lodge’s committee rules was the admission of 
hearsay. Hearsay, generally, is the report of someone else’s words that cannot be substantiated. 
While hearsay does have further meaning in a court of law, a committee hearing is not a legal 
court and is not bound to apply hearsay rules stringently. Witnesses such as Governor Taft and 
General Macarthur were allowed to liberally make use of hearsay testimony when it benefitted 
the pro-war and occupation case. For example, when Governor Taft was trying to make light of 
the use of the water cure,80 he stated that “there are some rather amusing instances of Filipinos 
who came in and said they would not say anything until they were tortured.”81 No one objected 
to this as hearsay, nor asked Taft who these Filipinos were, what their names were, or who told 
him that these Filipinos were coming in requesting the water cure. 
Contrast this with the treatment of hearsay testimony when it was damaging. When 
Sergeant Dube was asked whether he knew “of any other punishment or unusual conduct of 
American soldiers toward Filipinos” he began a story of the types of orders given to Army 
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soldiers by an officer by the name of Captain Butts. Before he could state what these orders were 
Chairman Lodge stated “you need not give hearsay evidence unless you can give the names of 
witnesses” which ended that line of inquiry.82 When Sergeant Charles Riley, who testified about 
seeing the use of the water cure firsthand once, tried to testify about how other soldiers told him 
about how they treated Filipinos, Senator Beveridge objected to hearsay, forcing Riley to move 
on to another subject.83 When Seiward Norton, a United States soldier in the Philippines, began 
answering a question about military misconduct by testifying about three United States soldiers 
in the Filipino town of San Juan, Beveridge quickly cut him off. Beveridge asked “were you with 
them?” and when Norton responded with a no Beveridge went on to say “what you relate then is 
hearsay… That has been excluded by the committee. The witness can only relate his personal 
observations.”84 Keeping out testimony about how the water cure was ordered to be used or how 
it was used by others besides the limited amount of witnesses called aided the Republican 
rhetoric that the water cure was, as General Macarthur euphemistically put it: “individual 
instances of excesses.”85 
However, when an objection could not be made, Republican senators were just as 
comfortable taking the less creative approach and simply interrupting witnesses. For example, 
when Senator Patterson, a Democrat from Colorado, was given his allotted time to question 
General Macarthur on military misconduct, he was interrupted by tangential clarifying questions 
being interjected by Republican Senators Beveridge, McComas, and Burrows. When Senator 
Patterson tried to ask General Macarthur if American troops were ordered to warn suspected 
insurgents three times before firing on them, Senator McComas interjected “does it appear that 
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there could have been any magic to stop those men if they had challenged the third time, from all 
circumstances?”86 Senator Patterson was interrupted so much during his questioning that 
Democrat Dubois pleaded with Chairman Lodge for order, stating: 
“Mr. Chairman, I submit that this is not fair. We have had it repeatedly here that the 
 majority are breaking in on the examination which belongs to Mr. Patterson. We have 
 had it in the investigation of every gentleman who has been before us. The Witness 
 makes his statement with scarcely any interruption from the minority… But the moment 
 the minority commence to ask questions they are interrupted by almost every member of 
 the majority except the chairman.”87 
But Chairman Lodge refused to admonish his Republican colleagues, and the 
interruptions continued, coming to a head during the testimony of the last witness, Admiral 
Dewey. Lodge was not present during this testimony and gave Beveridge the role of acting 
chairman. Beveridge used this power to interrupt Patterson even more, this time halting his 
questioning of Dewey to call the Democratic Senator’s questions “discourteous.” Patterson, 
clearly irritated by the incessant interruptions, responded “I don’t care what the opinion of the 
chair[man] is.” But Beveridge, using his power as acting chairman, commanded “and I will not 
allow the question to be put.”88 
While the Republican majority used objections and other interruptions to break up or stop 
adverse testimony or questioning, they had a more nuanced way to control witnesses who were 
friendly to their cause. 
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Leading Questions 
The majority of the witnesses, as we have seen, were sympathetic to the Republican 
cause of validating the war and occupying the Philippines, but they did not always know how 
best to skew their testimony to help further enhance the case for the Republicans. To fix this, the 
senators used leading questions. Leading questions are questions that prompts the desired 
answer, such as: “the car was blue, correct?” Sympathetic witnesses, knowing which senators 
were on their side, always answered in the way they were encouraged to by Republican senators.  
General Macarthur was unwaveringly imperialist, testifying that “wherever the American 
flag goes mankind will be benefited” and that “we were representing the highest stage of 
civilization.” But even Macarthur started to veer towards discussing misconduct, stating “of 
course in conducting war all of the ferocity of humanity is brought to the surface, and in 
individual instances excesses were have been committed.” But Beveridge got Macarthur back on 
message by prompting him with the question: “the general conduct of our soldiers and officers, 
irrespective of orders from headquarters, was in the direction of kindness, mercy, and humanity, 
was it?” Macarthur caught on, and returned to discussing the United States military generally in a 
strictly positive way.89 
The Republicans called Lieutenant Hall to help mitigate the damaging testimony by other 
witnesses about the severity of the war. Hall was clearly interested in defending the conduct of 
the military, going so far as to say that the military’s official casualty reports on the number of 
Filipinos killed were wrong. “I never saw as many dead as were reported afterwards…I think the 
mortality on both sides has been very slight on both sides. I think it has been exaggerated.”90 
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When Republican Senator Dietrich asked him “Do you think from what you have learned that 
the water cure is much less harmful than the vino [wine] that was drunk by many of our soldiers 
voluntarily?” he responded to the leading question: “I imagine it would be less harmful, yes.”91 
Despite the fact that Lieutenant Hall never brought up the water cure being less harmful than 
drinking wine, Dietrich was able to use leading questions and a loyal witness to elicit the 
testimony and marginalize the severity of the water cure’s effects. 
Whataboutism 
Another strategy used by the Republican senators has become known as whataboutism. 
The whataboutism strategy is to not directly respond to an argument, but instead to bring up a 
different point that discredits the opposition. During testimony in which United States soldiers 
were reported to commit horrific deeds, Republican senators would immediately ask questions 
about misconduct by Filipino forces, even though it makes the actions by United States soldiers 
no less horrific or illegal. At best, this was used to redirect attention away from damning facts, 
but at worst it was used to justify the atrocities committed by the soldiers against Filipinos. 
After Sergeant Riley testified that he witnessed United States soldiers torture the mayor 
of the Filipino town of Igbaras and then burn down the entire town, Lodge responded by reciting 
crimes committed by Filipinos against Americans, and simply adding “is that true?” to the end of 
each recitation to make it a proper question. “Private Dugan, Hayes, and Tracy, of Company F, 
were murdered by the town authorities at Calinog” … “Private Nolan, at Dingle, was tied up by 
the ladies while in a stupor. The insurgents were sent for and cut his throat” … “the body of 
Corporal Doheny, of Company D, was dug up, burned, and mutilated at Dumangas,” the 
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Chairman went on like this for nearly a full page of testimony, reading off a list of crimes he 
requested from the Secretary of War Elihu Root.92 None of this directly related to Sergeant 
Riley, or was linked to the torture of the mayor of Igbaras or the burning of the town. Instead, 
reciting this list of Filipino crimes is aimed at directing attention away from the damaging 
testimony about American misconduct. Or worse, perhaps Senator Lodge did see it as related, as 
a justification for the United States soldiers’ actions in the Philippines. 
This whataboutism was also used in the opposite extreme. Shortly after Captain Fred 
McDonald denied the statements of a previous witness that there were orders to “take no 
prisoners,” Beveridge quickly turned the witness’s attention to how high quality the food was 
that they served to Filipino prisoners. Beveridge asked McDonald if the Army served the 
prisoners “fish in the way they liked it,” or if they “served it up in according to their tastes.”93 
Similarly, after Sergeant Manning testified that his commanding officer had ordered their 
company to make use of the water cure, and that he had witnessed it being administered to 
Filipinos to try and gain information, Beveridge asked him “what kind of food” Filipino 
prisoners were given and whether “that was the food that they preferred.”94 This is also 
whataboutism. In response to allegations of torturing prisoners, Beveridge redirects attention by 
pointing to how the prisoners were fed well, even though food provisioning is not related or of 
comparable significance to the serious crimes being investigated. 
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Uncooperative Witnesses 
It has already been established that some witnesses who were partial to the Republican 
senators’ cause let themselves be led by the senators’ questions and offered useful evidence to 
help out the case for validating the war effort and continuing to occupy the Philippines. On the 
other hand, many of these witnesses were uncooperative, and at times even needlessly contrarian 
when it came time to answer questions by the Democratic senators.  
Most of this came down to the fact that, due to Lodge’s control of the committee, almost 
all of the witnesses were either previously or currently members of the United States military. 
Therefore, many of the witnesses saw it as their duty to defend the the United States military, 
putting them at odds with the Democratic senators trying to investigate misconduct. As George 
Boardman put it while being questioned by Senator Patterson: “It is the unwritten law that one 
soldier shall not talk against another soldier, and I am a soldier.” When asked to expand upon 
what he meant by that by Senator Patterson, he stated that “a man who has been with his 
comrades for three years through the privations of war would be considered a pretty low man 
who would come and testify against that comrade.”95 This “us versus them” mentality made 
many of the witnesses refuse to adequately answer questions by Democratic senators, seeing it as 
a betrayal of their fellow soldiers whose actions were being investigated. 
The best example of an uncooperative witness was Admiral Dewey, who at times refused 
to even answer questions from Democratic senators he did not like. When Senator Patterson tried 
questioning Admiral Dewey on the statements of his fellow General Anderson that Dewey had 
given orders to supply Aguinaldo’s rebels with guns and ammunition to fight the Spanish, 
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Dewey quipped “I do not like your questions a bit. I did not like them yesterday and I do not like 
them today.” The Admiral’s refusal to respond was supported by Beveridge, who was the acting 
Chairman during his testimony. Beveridge assured Dewey that “you will not be required to 
answer questions that may, in any way, in your judgement, reflect upon brother officers or 
criticize officers of the Army or Navy.”96  
The assurance by the majority that they would not have to answer incriminating questions 
coupled with the military’s “unwritten law” as Boardman put it of not speaking ill of other 
soldiers meant that the Democrats were fighting an uphill battle to elicit any useful evidence 
from many of the witnesses. 
Appeals to Racist Sentiments 
Another strategy used to deflect blame from the military and the pro-war administration 
was the use of prejudice. The Republican senators and the witnesses who supported them 
justified the occupation of the Philippines and excused the atrocious actions of the military by 
asserting that Filipinos were incapable of self-rule and that violence was at times the only kind of 
diplomacy they understood. These assertions drew on racist sentiments and had no basis in fact. 
They were used to prejudice the American people against the Filipinos so that they would more 
willingly accept the actions of the military and the pro-war administration.  
David Barrows, who was in charge of establishing schools in the Philippines, testified at 
length on his opinion of the Filipino people as a race to help justify United States rule. When 
asked by Senator Beveridge whether he believed that Filipinos were capable of self-government, 
Barrows responded that he believed that the Filipino race was developing, but that “political 
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experience sufficient to govern… is about the last thing that a man or a race attains… I never 
expect to live to see the day when he [the Filipino] can govern.”97 Bishop James Thoburn, who 
was the Methodist Bishop in charge of all of his denomination’s branches in India and Malaysia, 
and who had made a few visits to the Philippines, was also asked to testify to the racial abilities 
of the Filipinos. Bishop Thoburn asserted that the people of Malaysia known as “Malays” and 
the Filipinos were of the same race, and when asked by Senator Beveridge what he thought 
“what the capacity of the Malays for self-government” was, he responded “I think he is very 
defective in that point; indeed, very defective.” He went on to explain that the Filipinos could not 
be trusted as they were “treacherous in their character.”98 
More alarming than the use of racial prejudice to justify United States control was the use 
of prejudice to justify American atrocities. When Governor Taft was asked “when a war is 
conducted by a superior race against those who they consider inferior in the scale of civilization, 
is it not the experience of the world that the superior race will almost involuntarily practice 
inhuman conduct?” The Governor answered: “There is much greater danger in such a case than 
when dealing with whites. There is no doubt about that.”99 The use of the word “involuntary” is 
especially troubling, as it takes the agency away from the soldiers who committed war crimes, 
and instead treats their race and the race of the Filipinos as the cause of their actions. General 
Robert Hughes testified cavalierly to the burning and destruction of Filipino houses as “a 
punishment” for Filipinos he suspected of housing or aiding insurgents. When Democratic 
Senator Rawlins queried “but is that within the ordinary rules of civilized warfare?” Hughes 
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simply replied “these people are not civilized.”100 This strategy excused the actions of United 
States military personnel by arguing that Filipino people were not granted the same rights and 
laws of war as other peoples. The response of General Hughes, for example, does not actually 
answer the question of whether his actions were within the rules of civilized warfare, and instead 
deflects to answer instead about whether or not the Filipinos deserve the qualification in the first 
place. 
Invocation of God 
 When appeals to racist sentiments or whataboutism did not work to deflect damaging 
testimony, Republican senators and their witnesses also relied on appeals to God and religion to 
justify the war effort and occupation. The most transparent example of this is in the testimony of 
Bishop Thoburn. 
 Bishop Thoburn asserted that the United States control of the Philippines occurred by the 
will of God. He stated that United States occupation “did not come by deliberate design of the 
American government – and so I attribute it Providence, another name for God.” Senator 
Patterson incredulously subsequently asked him “you think we are there without any design on 
our own part, but through the hand of Providence?” To which the Bishop confidently answered 
“I do.”101 This strategy, much like the appeal to racist sentiments, took the agency away from the 
United States administration, and placed the responsibility for their actions elsewhere. Also 
much like the appeals to racist sentiments, it was not only used to justify occupation, but also to 
justify misconduct and atrocities. 
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 The Republicans called an Army officer named Colonel Wagner primarily to mitigate the 
severe rhetoric espoused by anti-imperialists about the concentration camps in the Philippines. 
He testified that these camps, made to concentrate and control the Filipino populations in 
insurgent-controlled areas, were actually a humanitarian effort to protect natives from insurgents, 
assure they were fed and to ensure they met certain sanitation standards. However, when asked 
whether certain towns were destroyed by the military, Colonel Wagner responded in the 
affirmative, but justified it by stating “the Almighty had destroyed Sodom” to which Senator 
Beveridge added on “how strange; I was thinking of that instance of Sodom and Gomorrah.”102 
 This strategy, just like whataboutism and appeals to racist sentiments, ignored the real 
issues and diverted attention to a tangential topic to shift attention and blame. However, bias in 
the hearings and controlling the narrative did not stop with witness calls, Senate rules, or clever 
distractions. Not even submitted documentary evidence was safe from bias and manipulation. 
Selective Documentary Evidence 
 In addition to the spoken testimony, witnesses were allowed to submit documents as 
evidence onto the Congressional Record for the senators, and eventually the American people, to 
read. Figures such as Secretary of War Elihu Root, who did not testify before the committee, 
instead sent in written testimony. This written testimony, however, was selectively chosen to 
only represent positive aspects of the war, while ignoring any negative evidence. 
 Governor Taft, in addition to his testimony, turned in hundreds of pages of written reports 
from civil governors serving under him in the Philippines. These reports backed up his claims of 
benevolent American rule and Filipino desire for American occupation. However, as brought to 
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light by Democratic Senator Culberson, Taft had decided not to include a governor’s report that 
he found to disagree with his own testimony. Senator Culberson explained that “it appears that 
Governor Taft has withheld at least one civil governor’s report contrary to the rule of this 
committee.” Culberson went on to explain that this report contained “serious charges against the 
military administration in that province and against the conduct of the army generally.” 
Culberson then accused Taft of attempting to “violate the rules of the committee” and asked that 
this final report be added to the Congressional Record. Lodge responded that he was made aware 
of the report, and that it had been withheld at the request of the War Department because “they 
made most sweeping attacks on the officers of the Army” and that the War Department thought it 
was unfair. Senator Culberson cuts to the core of the problem in his response that “that assumes 
authority upon the Secretary of War to control the examination of the committee.”103 The 
Secretary of War is a part of the executive branch, and holds no direct power over the Senate, 
therefore Chairman Lodge’s granting of this request to withhold some reports that were negative 
while allowing in others showed that the committee was working directly with the President’s 
administration to manipulate the hearings.  
 The committee also requested that the Secretary of War send them a report on the 
military courts-martial regarding the “cruelty and oppression” exhibited by American soldiers. 
However, Secretary Root provided much more than was requested. While only a report on the 
courts-martial regarding military misconduct was requested, Secretary Root submitted a seven-
section report, only two of which included these courts-martial. The other five unsolicited 
sections of his report included his own assertions that “the war on the part of the Filipinos has 
been conducted with the barbarous cruelty common among all uncivilized races,” a letter from a 
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United States officer alleging that the charges of misconduct were an “atrocious lie without the 
slightest foundation in fact,” dated military rules issued by President Lincoln in 1863 during the 
height of the Civil War, and numerous reports on cruelties committed by Filipino insurgents, 
despite the fact that it was United States courts-martial which were requested. Most of these 
sections were not what was requested by the committee, and shows not only an attempt to bury 
damaging evidence in a sea of irrelevance, but also the use of other strategies used during the 
hearings, such as whataboutism and appeals to racist sentiments.  
 Requested or volunteered documentary evidence was selectively submitted to present a 
more benevolent view of United States occupation and military actions. Even when damaging 
reports were specifically requested, administration officials offered their own spin to the 
evidence. Chairman Lodge was not content to only control the evidence, however. He also 
controlled who was immediately allowed to see the evidence and report it to the American 
people. 
Censoring the Press 
Just like Congress, the American press was split between those that supported imperialist 
expansion and the war and those who opposed it. Many large papers, such as The New York 
Times, supported the administration, but the stories coming out of the Philippines were too 
scandalous not to attract attention. The Atlanta Constitution asked the question in February of 
1902 “Do We Torture Filipinos?” in which the newspaper promptly answered its own question 
by quoting Senator Teller in saying that “of 160 Filipinos whom the water cure had been applied, 
all but twenty-six had died from its effects.”104 The Chicago Daily Tribune titled one of their 
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sections in an article “Army Apparently Disgraced.”105 One of the most poignant criticisms of 
the use of the water cure came from the massively popular Life magazine in May of 1902. In this 
cartoon, shown below, two American soldiers, watched over by an officer, hold a gun to the head 
of a Filipino man while holding a spout in his mouth from a bucket with the words “U.S. Army” 
emblazoned across it. In the background, five men dressed in the regalia of various European 
militaries, including the British, Spanish, French, and German look on and laugh. At the bottom 
of the cartoon, they are quoted as saying “Those pious Yankees can’t throw stones at us 
anymore.”106 This cartoon shows the falsity of American exceptionalism and the hypocrisy of the 
moral criticisms America had been directing towards European nations throughout the nineteenth 
century for their colonial actions. 
107 
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 Lodge knew that the Congressional Record was public, and at the end of the hearings it 
would have to be revealed. Furthermore, he knew that he did not have the power to stop the 
press’ right to view the hearings in their entirety, but that did not mean he could not limit them. 
To stop more critical press about the event, Lodge advocated to severely limit the number of 
reporters allowed to view the hearings. Senator Lodge only allowed three newspaper 
correspondents in the hearings, claiming, according to the Washington Post, “that the capacity of 
the room was limited,” and that the “room was totally inadequate for the accommodation of the 
public.” Senator Patterson, however, called for the hearings to be open to all, and accused Lodge 
of wanting to hold the hearings in secret, an accusation that the Chairman denied vigorously. 
However, Lodge’s insistence that the only members of the public allowed into the hearings be 
three selected newspaper correspondents, and that the rest of the country only rely on reports 
released by those three correspondents, shows a clear desire to limit the press and the public’s 
immediate access to the damaging testimony being elicited.108 
 For the duration of the hearings, Lodge continued to deny public access to the hearings 
despite calls from Democratic senators for increased transparency. As the humid D.C. summer 
began to approach, and senators began to leave for their respective states, Lodge ended the 
Committee on the Philippines’ hearings. But the end of the hearings did not mean the end of 
Republican’s manipulation of them. 
Post-Hearings Manipulation 
 After the hearings, the Washington Government Printing Office finished organizing and 
printing all of the testimony and evidence from the hearings. However, the transcript was 2,894 
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pages of single-spaced, small type characters. Reading the hearings in their entirety was a feat 
few achieved, and definitely beyond the time or attention span of the American people, who 
mostly would not have been able to get their hands on a copy of the massive transcript even if 
they wanted to. Senator Beveridge, however, saw this issue as an opportunity. Beveridge, who 
was present and who participated in almost all of the hearings, released a “summary” of the 
hearings in a separate public Senate document in June of 1902. 
 Beveridge started his summary by stating that anti-imperialist senators were “slandering 
the army” and trying to take “exceptional instances… as though they were the customary 
conduct of the American Army.” He went on to state that “I do not think the mere assertion of 
senators will be controlling or convincing. But certainly, the words of those who had been upon 
the ground and who have studied the question and who have observed conditions there ought to 
carry greater weight.” Then, in a mere 78 pages, Beveridge “summarizes” all 2,894 pages of 
evidence. Yet, despite his assertion that the testimony of “those upon the ground… ought to 
carry greater weight,” Beveridge declined to include any testimony at all from many front-line 
soldiers. While his summary had much testimony from pro-war and pro-occupation higher-ups 
like Governor Taft, Admiral Dewey, Colonel Wagner, and Generals Macarthur, Otis, and 
Hughes, soldiers who testified to witnessing atrocities firsthand like Sergeant Davis or Sergeant 
Dube, were not even mentioned once throughout the summary. Instead, frontline soldiers whose 
testimony that was cited were the likes of Captain McDonald, who claimed to have never seen 
the water cure Most other cited testimony by soldiers was regarding whether or not Filipino 
prisoners were fed well or treated by doctors when captured, a clear use of the whataboutism 
strategy that the Republican senators used throughout the hearings. Despite the summary’s 
brevity, many pages are occupied with assertions that “Filipinos can copy but not invent,” 
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“Filipinos ‘averse to social order’,” or even “Filipinos have no idea of organization” that 
Beveridge cites from a book by author John Foreman, to help back up his claim that they need 
American occupation.109  
 Beveridge’s summary took any significant adverse testimony and buried it in a last act of 
manipulation before the hearings faded out of the spotlight. The Democratic senators, either fed 
up with the whole charade or having moved on to other concerns, seemed to have taken the 
injustice done to their months of work lying down. No rebuke was made in the Senate in the 
form of an opposing summary or otherwise during the rest of the session. Instead, Congress went 
into recess for the summer and the debate took to the newspapers. The Republicans’ success 
during the hearings can best be seen in the press. Imperialist papers returned to vindicating and 
justifying the war, now espousing the same rhetoric they read in the hearings. The New York 
Times defended American atrocities, writing “having the devil to fight, it [the military] has 
sometimes used fire.” The New York Tribune, Providence Journal, Harper’s Weekly and other 
imperialist papers were granted a renewed vigor by the Republican’s narrative in the hearings, 
and all reported favorably on the war following the hearings as the summer approached.110 In the 
following Senate session in 1903, Democratic Senator Carmack tried to rekindle the issue with a 
speech on the floor about the atrocities, but to no avail. American imperialists felt vindicated in 
their beliefs and had moved on. The Committee on the Philippines held no further hearings on 
the matter. 
 However, the hearings in the Senate were not the only means the United States had of 
dealing with the allegations. Happening parallel to the hearings were the military courts-martial, 
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which had the potential to not only expose wrongdoing, but also to create lasting impacts on the 
military by punishing those responsible for committing atrocities overseas. 
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The Courts-Martial 
As American abuses in the Philippines were being addressed in Congress, they were also 
being addressed internally by the United States Armed Forces. The military has its own justice 
system, with trials known as courts-martial. Much like standard civilian trials in the rest of the 
United States, a court-martial can set a standard for acceptable behavior in the military, what 
precedent military judges and advocates have to rely on when making cases, and frankly, what 
an American soldier can and cannot get away with. The Philippine-American War was one of the 
United States’ first overseas imperial ventures, and the first one with a widely publicized 
misconduct scandal, and how the military dealt with the issue through their justice system would 
set the standard for the conduct of the United States military in every major overseas conflict 
since.  
But American military officials did not see it this way, and neither did the Roosevelt 
administration. As established in the background chapters, Roosevelt had been a supporter of 
occupying the Philippines, and as President, he was not keen on back-peddling. Instead, as 
stories of misconduct came back with American soldiers in 1902 he stated that there were “few 
acts of cruelty” and only “in retaliation [for] the hundreds committed by Filipinos”; even going 
as far as to state that it was “one of the most glorious wars in the nation’s history.”111 Military 
officials also refused to concede their mistakes, with one being quoted in The Advocate of Peace 
as stating that the war was “remarkably humane.”112 Colonel Dickman of the Twenty-Sixth 
Volunteer Infantry, the same regiment that Charles S. Riley, who testified to the use of the water 
cure, wrote a report denying the committee’s findings on the water cure. He wrote that “the 
 
111 Quoted in Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 250. 
112 "The Inherent Cruelty and Inhumanity of War." The Advocate of Peace, no. 12 (1902): 215-16. 
Khoshbin 55 
 
conduct of the American troops in the Philippines has been so humane as to be a continuous 
source of surprise to all foreigners and natives.”113 However, despite all of their failures to 
conduct a fair investigation into American misconduct in the Philippines, the hearings succeeded 
in garnering enough attention to force Roosevelt to change his  stance on the conduct of the 
military. 
Pressure to Hold the Military Accountable 
After the damaging testimony of Charles Riley concerning the use of the water cure, 
Roosevelt held an emergency cabinet meeting on how to deal with the scandal.114 Anti-
imperialist papers and even magazines like Life, as was shown in the preceding chapter, were 
latching onto the outrage and Roosevelt needed to take action to mitigate the scandal’s damage. 
The issue was further exacerbated by the controversial result of the court-martial of Major Tony 
Waller. 
Major Waller, who was hailed as a war hero after he led American soldiers during the 
Boxer Rebellion in China and who served in the Philippines, was charged by the United States 
Army of murdering Filipino prisoners. His trial was heavily publicized, and many Americans 
were shocked when Waller admitted to the execution of a dozen Filipino prisoners. In his 
defense, Waller cited a distrust of the Filipinos, Filipino treacheries, and most importantly, the 
orders from his commanding officer, General Smith, to “kill and burn anyone over ten.” Despite 
it being proven that he had directly commanded the execution of a dozen prisoners, Waller was 
acquitted, and allowed to retake his position in the military.115 
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This verdict, as well as the testimony of Charles Riley, drew such attention that the 
President had to act. After his emergency cabinet meeting, he promised an investigation into the 
charges “of the most thorough and sweeping character” and that “no provocation, however great, 
can be accepted as an excuse for the misuse of the necessary severity of war.”116 Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of War, Elihu Root, immediately sent a letter to Lodge’s ongoing hearings in the 
Committee on the Philippines citing a bevy of cases of American misconduct that the military 
had already convicted soldiers of, in an effort to convince Congress that the military had been 
proactive on this matter. However, Root failed to note that he had the sentences of these 
convicted soldiers reduced, effectively holding them guilty only in the official record.117 
President Roosevelt kept his promise and launched an investigation into the reports of 
misconduct, indicting new officers and starting new cases. But whether justice would truly be 
served, or just a sham dog and pony show to quiet his critics, remained to be seen. 
Before delving into the subsequent events, it is important to note how a U.S. court-
martial was held during the Philippine-American War. Fortunately, the publicizing of the abuses 
of the war meant that the American people were curious as to how these trials functioned as well, 
and The North American Review published a guide in its magazine explaining exactly how a 
court-martial took place during the war. In many ways, the court-martial system emulates the 
justice system in the rest of the nation. The author of the article, Earl Cranston, who served in the 
United States military himself and held an LL.D. from Ohio University, notes that “there obtains 
in courts-martial the same right to a trial by jury as in courts of law, and the same rules of 
evidence are adopted.”118 This means that courts-martial are adjudicated by a council of ones 
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peers, just like in a civilian trial, and that the same rules in terms of verifying evidence and 
calling witnesses were used. Despite these procedural similarities, these courts-martial had a 
major difference: the jury was also the judge. Cranston notes that “the court exercises a dual 
function. In its judicial capacity, it passes on all propositions of law; as a jury, it passes on all 
matters of fact. It is an anomalous system… and leaves the application of those rules to a body of 
laymen.”119 Where in civilian court a judge rules on objections and decides what evidence may 
be presented to the jury, the average court-martial during the Philippine-American War had the 
juries not only deciding the case, but also ruling on the evidence. While there was a judge-
advocate who was an appointed military lawyer whose duty it was to prosecute the case and also 
to counsel the jury as to matters of the law, but his role was strictly advisory.120 This distinction 
from a civilian trial gave the jury in a court-martial much more discretion, and could be 
problematic. As I will show in the subsequent section, the majority of the cases I explore 
occurred in Manila, meaning the panel of soldiers acting as the judge and jury were involved in 
the same campaign against the Filipinos that the accused was. 
A Failure of Justice 
After Roosevelt’s promise for action, a flurry of new high-profile courts-martial took 
place. In this section, I will analyze the most significant and publicized courts-martial, what the 
defendants were charged with, how they pleaded, whether the court found them guilty or 
acquitted them, and most importantly, how they decided to punish those they found guilty, which 
shows what significance they attribute to the crime, and how much they desire to deter future 
soldiers from acting in a similar fashion. These cases, which best exemplify the injustice of these 
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courts-martial, are organized from the least severe charge of misconduct to the most severe, to 
show arbitrary the sentences are when compared to the charge. 
One of the most significant courts-martial was that of General Jacob Smith. As has 
already been established, multiple people, including Waller in his trial, had reported that General 
Smith had told soldiers under his command to “kill and burn,” “turn Samar into a howling 
wilderness,” and even to “kill everyone over ten.” For these heinous orders, which, as we have 
seen by Major Waller’s justification of his actions, had severe consequences, General Smith was 
charged with “Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline” under the 62nd 
Article of War. According to Army Judge-Advocate Lieutenant-Colonel George Davis in 1899, 
“conduct to the prejudice of good order” was a relatively minor charge usually used as a catchall 
if there is not enough foundation for a more severe charge.121 The General pleaded not guilty. A 
court-martial was held in Manila to try him. During the trial, the General’s defense team did not 
deny that the General gave the order but instead attempted to justify it. They cited the Balangiga 
Massacre of American soldiers that happened previous to his commands, and called the 
inhabitants of Samar “religious fanatics” that were “very treacherous.” They claimed that the 
natives of Samar were “inferior” to other Filipinos. The defense even admitted that General 
Smith ordered the execution of boys over ten who were hostile, claiming that they “were equally 
dangerous as an enemy as those of more mature age.” The court was sympathetic to the 
General’s defense, and stated that it would be “lenient” because the General “did not mean 
everything that his unexplained language implied,” “that the orders were never executed,” and 
that the accused was under pressure because there was a “desperate struggle… conducted with a 
 
121 George Davis, A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States, 2nd Ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1899) 477. 
Khoshbin 59 
 
cruel and savage foe.” Although the court officially found General Smith guilty, his sentence was 
not a punishment at all. His official punishment was: “To be admonished by the reviewing 
authority.” “Admonishment,” was the General’s only punishment for his orders to kill everyone 
over ten in Samar. “The reviewing authority” that the court referred to was Theodore Roosevelt, 
who initially ordered the court-martial. Since the court refused to punish him, the final word on 
the trial would be made by Theodore Roosevelt.122  
Captain James Ryan was also tried in Manila by a jury of his fellow soldiers fighting in 
the Philippines. Captain Ryan was accused of ordering and administering the water cure on a 
Filipino mayor to elicit information, and repeatedly dunking the head of one of his prisoners in a 
bucket of water until he almost drowned as an interrogation method. Captain Ryan was also 
charged with “Conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline, in violation of the 62nd 
Article of War.” The Captain pled not guilty. The Captain’s defense team did not contest that 
they used water torture, and instead argued that “the average Filipino will not talk without being 
subjected to pressure of some kind” and that “let us apply General Sherman’s rules to the present 
insurrection in these islands.” The defense attempted, much like the defense of Smith, not to 
deny the act, but instead to justify it, even comparing Captain Ryan’s actions to Sherman’s 
March during the Civil War. The court found the captain “not guilty,” despite not even denying 
that he ordered the acts.123 
Major Edwin Glenn, whose trial was particularly political since Charles Riley and 
William Smith implicated him during Lodge’s committee hearings, was accused of ordering the 
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use of the water cure on a Filipino town mayor to garner information. Another officer, 
Lieutenant Julien Gaujot, was accused of the same, and both were charged with violating the 
62nd Article of War. They both made similar arguments to that of Captain Ryan, with neither 
denying the commands, but instead justifying it. In Gaujot’s statement to the court, he admitted 
to using the water cure, but explained that “I desire to briefly place before the court the 
conditions existing during the Insurrection on the Island of Samar so that the Court may more 
readily determine the extent of guilt attached to my actions.” Gaujot went on to describe the 
difficult geography of the island and how “crafty, lying and treacherous,” the Filipinos were, 
whom he characterized as “fanatical savages.” He asserted that the actions he took were 
necessary to ensure American success. In the sentencing of Major Glenn, the court stated that 
they would be “lenient on account of the circumstances” and suspended him for one month and 
fined him $50. Lieutenant Gaujot was given a similarly light sentence.124 
Captain Fred McDonald, discussed in the previous chapter, who was a pro-war witness 
called by Senator Lodge to help vindicate the war and who testified to never having seen the 
water cure and to the conduct of the United States military being exemplary, was charged with 
misconduct himself by the United States Army. Specifically, he was charged with having let a 
prisoner of war under his charge who was accused of being a “ladrone,” a bandit or criminal, be 
executed despite being given orders to “be careful no harm” came to him until his trial was 
complete. The accused “ladrone” claimed to be a secretary of one of Aguinaldo’s generals and to 
have not violated any laws of war. He wished for a trial to exonerate him from the accusation of 
being a criminal but was instead executed before any trial could be had. Captain McDonald was 
charged with “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in violation of the 
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62nd Article of War,” “disobedience of orders in violation of the 21st Article of War,” and 
“conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in violation of the 61st Article of War.” These 
charges are much more severe. Not only, like the preceding cases, did the Army charge him with 
violating the 62nd, but he was also charged with violating the 61st, which carries with it the 
sentence of “immediately being dismissed from service,” and violating the 21st, a crime that 
Judge-Advocate George Davis stated “constitutes the most serious offenses known to military 
law,” and could carry with it the sentence of death.125 He pled not guilty. The senior Captain who 
ordered McDonald to not allow the prisoner to be harmed testified that McDonald told him he 
wanted the prisoner shot, and when he was ordered not to allow that to happen, McDonald 
delayed the officer at a prolonged dinner, while he knew that native police were going to carry 
out the execution of the prisoner. McDonald’s soldiers watched as the prisoner was put before a 
chopping block and a Filipino policeman, believing him to be a criminal, tried to decapitate him. 
American soldiers who witnessed the attempted decapitation stated that despite two swings, the 
prisoner remained alive. American soldiers, knowing they could not commit the execution 
themselves, ordered the town mayor’s nephew to shoot the prisoner to put him out of his misery. 
It took him two full cylinders of bullets from his revolver to finally end the man’s life. The 
Captain was only found guilty of the most minor charge, violating the 62nd, and the court 
sentenced him to merely have his rank reduced to that of a more junior captain.126 
An even more egregious case was that of First Lieutenant Preston Brown, who was 
accused of killing a native Filipino he had taken prisoner and was charged with “Murder, in 
violation of the 58th Article of War.” Lieutenant Brown pled not guilty, and a trial was held in 
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Manila. During the trial, it was established that the Filipino victim was unarmed, and was 
apparently fishing near to where a skirmish was taking place between American and Filipino 
soldiers. During this skirmish, an American soldier was wounded and drowned in a river. 
American soldiers grabbed a nearby Filipino fisherman and brought him to Lieutenant Brown, 
stating that the Filipino saw where their man died, but refused to tell them so they could not 
recover the body. Witnesses then asserted that Brown stated he’d “teach that black son of a bitch 
a lesson,” approached the man and briefly questioned him before striking him with his pistol and 
subsequently shooting him in the head. Tragically, a soldier later testified that the fisherman had 
actually tried to help him save the wounded, drowning soldier, and that the whole event was a 
miscommunication. The defense tried to imply, by the man’s proximity to the fighting that he 
may have been an insurgent trying to pose as a civilian, and defense witnesses often referred to 
the victim as a “n-----." The court once again seemed convinced by the defense’s strategy of 
admission followed by justification through racist stereotype, and the judge-advocate general 
even concluded that “the circumstances which attended the taking of human life in this case are 
such to diminish materially the criminal responsibility of the accused” and that no prison time 
should be imposed. Instead, while Lieutenant Brown was found guilty, his only punishment was 
a “reduction in lineal rank on the list of first lieutenants” and “forfeiture of one-half of his 
monthly pay for a period of nine months.”127 This sentence seems especially anomalous when 
one reads the full wording of the 58th Article of War, which explains that “the punishment in any 
such case shall not be less than the punishment provided by the laws of the State, Territory, or 
district in which such offense may have been committed.”128 Despite this, the ruling made no 
mention of Filipino or American precedent for the punishment of murder, and let Brown off with 
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a punishment that was not comparable to the sentences for murder in either the United States or 
the Philippines. Brown got off with nothing more than a temporary reduction in pay and a longer 
wait for promotion and proceeded to have a long and successful career in the army, lasting 
through World War 1.  
The Unusual Nature of the Light Sentencing 
One way to explain away these exceptionally light sentences would be to assert that the 
United States Army during this time simply had a merciful justice system, and that soldiers 
regardless of their crimes usually were not punished harshly. But this is not the case. The 
military at this time had very harsh punishments for soldiers who even committed minor 
infractions, which make the light sentences given to American officers found guilty of torturing 
and murdering Filipinos seem even more ludicrous and unjust. To show how unusual these light 
sentences were, this section will give examples of how other crimes committed by United States 
soldiers in the Philippines were treated in the same time period.  
 Private Harry Tiedeman was found guilty of drunk and disorderly conduct in June of 
1902. His sentence was to be confined for three months of hard labor and a $60 fine. In contrast, 
Major Glenn, whose trial was held only a month later and was found guilty of torturing prisoners 
and sullying the name of the United States military, was only sentenced to a month suspension 
and a $50 fine. Private William Stafford was found guilty of assaulting a fellow member of the 
United States military. He was sentenced to four months of hard labor and a $40 fine. Compare 
this to the sentence of Preston Brown, who was found guilty of murdering a Filipino civilian, and 
faced no prison or hard labor time. The sentence for assaulting a member of the United States 
military was harsher than for murdering a Filipino. The punishment for conscripted native 
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Filipino soldiers were even more severe. Gregorio Zalazar was found guilty of “violation of the 
oath of allegiance.” He was sentenced to 10 years of hard labor.129  
 The disparity in sentencing shows what the military deemed as unacceptable. Infighting 
between its troops and drunkenness were taken seriously. Anything less than complete loyalty 
from conscripted natives was considered unacceptable. But the murder of Filipinos, torture, and 
commands to kill children were not considered critical enough for the military to offer severe 
punishments for. 
Turning a Blind Eye 
The cases of these United States Army officers serve as pertinent examples of the way 
the military chose to deal internally with the scandal. Even when the defendants admitted to 
committing the crimes, the court was partial to their pleas for clemency on the basis of racist 
sentiments about their enemies and the basic hardships of war. Even when they were found 
guilty, there were no true punishments. None of them were dishonorably discharged and none of 
them were imprisoned even when those found guilty of objectively far lesser crimes were. The 
army sent a message that would reverberate for years to come: if you commit atrocities against a 
people we deem inferior in war, we will protect you. 
However, the difference with these courts-martial, as opposed to that of Major Waller, 
was that President Roosevelt was watching the new cases. To make good on his promise for a 
sweeping investigation, President Roosevelt reviewed a few of these courts-martial personally, 
and although he took some action, it was marginal and spotty, and more for show than actual 
substantial change or reform. He disapproved of the sentence for Captain James Ryan, which 
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simply led to an inconsequential retrial. He disapproved the finding of another case where an 
American scout was charged with manslaughter for ordering the execution of Filipino prisoners 
he thought were trying to escape, leading to another inconsequential retrial. However, he also 
approved of some of the few trials he read. He approved of the lenient sentencing for Major 
Glenn and Lieutenant Gaujot.130 The most significant action he took was regarding the trial of 
General Smith. Although he officially approved of General Smith’s ‘punishment’ of 
admonishment, he then sent a very carefully worded letter that explained that the General had 
faced “intolerable provocations” and that “General Smith has behind him a long career 
distinguished for gallantry and on the whole for good conduct. Taken in the full, his work has 
been such to reflect credit upon the American Army,” and after pandering to his patriotic base, 
and implying that he actually approved of the General’s commands, Roosevelt ends his laudatory 
letter by asking that General Smith be “retired from the active list.”131  
Honorably retiring General Smith was the closest Roosevelt came to making a serious 
change to the military’s administration of justice. His investigation into the courts-martial was so 
minor to suggest that he was simply doing it for show to vindicate his record as a president who 
does not allow war crimes, and to put the anti-imperialists at ease. But after reading just a few 
courts-martial, and intervening in even less, the President moved on, busying himself with the 
establishment of National Parks and taking on the monopolies of robber barons with a series of 
anti-trust legislation. Even when Major Glenn, whose first case was reviewed by Roosevelt, was 
charged again, this time with murdering seven Filipino prisoners, the President never intervened 
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again in the court-martial system of the Army, instead allowing Glenn and others to be quietly 
acquitted as he turned a blind eye.132 
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An Imperialist Victory and Lessons Lost 
Conclusion 
 As the presidential election of 1904 approached, newspaper founder and editor Henry 
Watterson, who would subsequently win the Pulitzer Prize, wrote that “the paramount issue, the 
issue of issues, in 1904 will be the Philippines.”133 If he was right, than the election showcased 
an unmitigated victory for American imperialism, and the triumph of Lodge and his fellow 
Republicans in Congress in the military misconduct scandal. Roosevelt, who had defended the 
war and promised to continue occupying the Philippines, won in a landslide victory over 
Democrat Alton B. Parker. Senators Lodge and Beveridge, the two most impassioned defenders 
of imperialism in the Senate, who fought for American intervention in 1899 and continued to 
defend the war up through its conclusion, were both reelected. The Republicans, unhurt by the 
Philippines scandal thanks to the efforts they took to mitigate its impact, maintained their 
majority in Congress. The people of the United States had bought the tale that the imperialists 
had spun for them, a tale of patriotic heroism and benevolence against savages on an island that 
needed American authority.  
 Americans began to get tired of the anti-imperialists citing military misconduct, 
especially the water cure. Barraged for months with horrific stories of torture and bloodshed, the 
American public’s outrage began to sputter and die.  This is well illustrated in a joke column in 
the Cleveland Dealer, which published the joke: “Ma: What’s that sound of running water out 
there, Willie? Willie: It’s just us boys ma. We’ve been trying the Filipino water cure on Bobbie 
Snow and now we’re pouring him out.”134 The Washington Times also made light of the water 
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cure, writing a story on how the Secret Service should have administered “the water cure, in 
proper Philippine style,” to a drunk who was trying to serenade President Roosevelt while he was 
traveling through Massachusetts.135 This use of humor shows how apathetic the American public 
had become towards the issue, and their desire to move on from that political outrage. The 
Democrats had missed their chance to capitalize on the public’s attention due to the Republican’s 
ability to complicate and manipulate the issue until it fell from prominence.  
 Although the public moved on from the Philippines and the President had declared the 
war ended, war continued for years in the southern provinces of the Philippines, now unfettered 
from the same level of public scrutiny present in 1902. In 1906, a group of Moros, a southern 
Muslim Filipino tribe, revolted and took refuge in a crater outside of United States control. 
United States soldiers were sent to crush the rebellion, and killed every single member of the 
revolting tribe. Men, women, and children, numbering around one thousand in total. This became 
known euphemistically as the First Battle of Bud Dajo, and more realistically as the Moro Crater 
Massacre.136 This shows how the military learned little from its misconduct scandal only a few 
years prior, and the true cost of the military courts refusing to do justice and make an example of 
what is unacceptable military behavior. 
 The Philippine-American War was the first war of its kind for America: an overseas 
counterinsurgency effort in a hostile environment against a different race with different customs 
and languages. This war was an opportunity for the military to set a standard for how its soldiers 
were to act in this scenario. But instead, military officials and politicians, eager to protect their 
own interests, marginalized the significance of American misconduct in the war. Instead of a 
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precedent of accountability and dignity, this set a precedent of abuse and complicity. The 
precedent set in the Philippine-American War has echoed throughout overseas conflicts against 
primarily nonwhite races and every counterinsurgency effort the United States has been involved 
in. In the My Lai Massacre in the Vietnam War, a company of United States soldiers burned 
down a Vietnamese town and murdered almost all of its citizens, including the men, women and 
children in an action reminiscent of the burning of towns in the Philippines and the Moro Crater 
Massacre. In the Second Persian Gulf War, United States soldiers were found to have viciously 
tortured prisoners of war sometimes resulting in their deaths at Abu Ghraib, similar to the vicious 
torture and murder of Filipino prisoners in the Philippine-American War. 
 The clearest example of the military’s disregard for the lessons learned in the Philippine-
American War is the reemergence of the use of water torture. As recently as 2005 there have 
been reports of the Central Intelligence Agency using “waterboarding” to secure confessions 
from suspected terrorists. Waterboarding is a practice similar to the water cure. In waterboarding 
“cellophane is wrapped over the prisoners face and water is poured over him, the gag reflex sets 
in, responding to the fear of drowning.”137 This scandal led to public outcry again, and an issue 
that could have been dealt with for good at the beginning of the twentieth century instead 
continues to be debated at the beginning of the twenty-first. Had the military administered justice 
fairly, precedents could have been set that may have deterred these practices from persisting. 
 Like the courts-martial, the manipulation of the hearings of the Philippine-American War 
has also skewed the memory and lessons of the Philippine-American War. Instead of serving as a 
monument to the dangers of unchecked imperialist ambition, the war and subsequent occupation 
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of the Philippines was remembered as Lodge and the Republicans of his committee wanted it to 
be: as the success of American liberty over foreign savagery and tyranny. To see this, one only 
needs to look at the statements of recent United States leaders. President Bush, in a speech made 
in 2003, used the Philippines as an example for how he planned to help turn Iraq into a “vibrant 
democracy.” He stated that the United States “liberated the Philippines from colonial rule,” in a 
reference to the Spanish, while ignoring the United States’ own occupation of the archipelago.138 
President Trump has also referenced the Philippines, citing fictitious war crimes alleged to have 
been committed by General Pershing around the time of the Moro Crater Massacre as evidence 
for his claim that harsh tactics on terrorism are effective.139 While his story of Pershing executing 
prisoners is fake, his belief that it is true, as well as the gullibility of those that believed the 
claim, shows that the conflict in the Philippines is not well understood by the American public at 
large, and thanks to how the story was manipulated, has become a tale of American success in 
counterinsurgency, instead of a warning.  
 The hearings have also set a standard for partisan investigations by Congress aimed to 
vindicate political beliefs instead of seeking out the truth. Hearings and investigations by 
Congress have become more commonplace in the twenty-first century, and ever more biased and 
manipulative. During the confirmation hearings for Brett Kavanaugh, two women came forward 
with allegations of sexual assault. However, in a similar fashion to how the Republican majority 
controlled what witnesses were called for in the Philippine hearings, the Republican majority 
only allowed Christine Blasey Ford to publicly testify, and blocked the motion to allow the 
second accuser, Deborah Ramirez, to testify.140 In another egregious action to block a proper 
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investigation and manipulate what evidence makes it to the public record, the Republican 
majority blocked a motion to allow any witnesses to testify in the Senate impeachment trial of 
Donald Trump.141   
Our legal institutions and political representatives have an immense effect on shaping 
public perception and setting a standard for American involvement abroad. Unfortunately, the 
Philippine-American War set a standard of injustice in the military and political manipulation at 
home. How to fix unjust courts and manipulative partisan politics is a topic that has been debated 
in the United States since the Constitution was written. But undoubtedly, the first step to fixing a 
broken system is to recognize that it is one. 
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